COLD RELIC’s best trick is not the phishing; it is that the next victim’s inbox now contains a colleague.
On 17 November Google’s threat intelligence team published a case study of COLD RELIC, the Russian group also known as Star Blizzard, which the US Department of Justice has assessed operates within the FSB.
At a US organisation, it logged in with stolen Super Admin credentials through a residential proxy near the victim, then sent MFA push requests until someone approved one. It then enrolled its own passkeys, backup codes and MFA devices and stayed for several months. Google says the passkeys survived password and session resets, which is a rather unkind test of phishing-resistant authentication.
In 2026, someone posing as an employee of that first victim approached a second US organisation over an encrypted messaging app and shared phishing links for Entra ID credentials. After a successful login the group registered a new MFA device, as it does. In at least one case a victim reset passwords but never revoked the hijacked sessions, so the group kept its access. Google’s remediation advice says “password changes alone are insufficient”.
Check whether your incident playbook revokes sessions and OAuth grants and removes unrecognised passkeys, backup codes and MFA devices, not merely resets a password; Google lists all four. An authentication method that cannot be phished is still happy to be enrolled by whoever got in first.
Sources: Google Cloud Blog · Help Net Security